No. 89-1391 and No. 89-1392

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 1990

DR. IRVING RUST, et al. PETITIONERS

V.

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES

THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al PETITIONERS

v.

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES

ON PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE WITH BRIEF BY LEGAL DEFENSE FOR UNBORN CHILDREN

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### MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PILE

#### Interest of Amicus

The brief, which does not support any party, defends the constitutional right to life of the unborn, which the parties have not done.

### Argument

The amicus proves that the the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of life to "any person" does include the unborn. Thus this Court must not only overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, it must rule that the States have a duty to protect unborn life. The parties have not raised this issue; it disposes of all issues in this case.

The universal guarantee of life to

"any person" is the most important right in
the Constitution, and the lives of millions
of children depend on their being permitted
to present all relevant evidence to prove
their unalienable right to life.

Alan Ernest, Counsel

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## Interest of Amicus

The amicus defends the right to life of the unborn, which the parties have not done.

Summary of Argument

The unalienable guarantee of life to

"any person," made in the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments, includes the unborn.

### Argument

THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON," MADE BY THE CONSTITUTION, INCLUDES THE UNBORN.

1. THE LETTER OF THE LAW (THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON," THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT WORDS EVER ENACTED INTO LAW) ON ITS FACE INCLUDES THE UNBORN.

The 5th and 14th Amendments guarantee that not "any person" can be deprived of "life ... without due process of law." The words "any person" are universal, admit of no exceptions for anyone, make no distinction between born and unborn life, and thus on their face include the unborn, the same as everyone else. The obvious purpose of guaranteeing life universally to "any person" was to forbid making exceptions so some persons could be exterminated.

"person" included the unborn, then Roe v.

Wade "collapses," because the unborn's lives would be "guaranteed" by the Constitution.

In ruling "the word 'person' ... does not include the unborn," the Court hit the Constitution head on, did what is expressly forbidden, and directly defied the letter of the law of its most important guarantee.

The words "any person" are the two most important words ever written into law. The guarantee of life to "any person" is the single most important guarantee because it protects the lives of everybody from government sanctioned extermination, as happened in Nazi Germany.

And the words "any person" give legal body to the spirit that "all men are created equal" and endowed with an "unalienable" right to life. The words "any person" exactly summarize what America stands for,

<sup>1.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-157.

<sup>2.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158.

Abraham Lincoln said, what made America great was the promise "not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time ... that ALL should have an equal chance."

The words "any person" are the very words which guarantee that equal chance to "ALL"; they stand as the supreme political achievement of the human race, the prize of milleniums of struggle. If the Constitution had stated it protected the life of "any person - except the unborn," then its words would support Roe v. Wade. But its words say "any person," without any exceptions at all.

The Supreme Court of West Germany held that the words, "Everybody has the right to life," did include the unborn; it explained that the word "everybody" is universal.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3.</sup> R. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution The Need For A Life Protective Amendment, 63 Cal. L. Rev. at 1341-51 (1975). In 1975 the Supreme Court of West Germany ruled that the phrase in its Constitution, "Everybody has the right to life," did include the unborn, that "Abortion is an act of homicide," and

The Constitution extends its guarantee of life to "any person." The letter of the law permits no exceptions; on their face the words "any person" do include the unborn.

2. THE MODIFIER "ANY" INVOKES A VIRTUALLY IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" INCLUDES THE UNBORN.

The Court never studied the letter of
the law - the universal words "any person."
Instead the Court focused on the isolated
word "person," and ignored its modifier
"any," which invokes a virtually irrebuttable presumption in favor of life that the
words "any person" do include the unborn.

By reading the guarantee of life to

"any person" as if it merely said "some

persons," the Court did the most forbidden

the state had a "duty ... to protect unborn
life." It noted "Everybody" is universal:

The right to live is guaranteed to everybody who is "alive." No distinction can be made among the several stages of developing life before birth, or between prenatal or postnatal life. "Everybody"... means every "living person,"... therefore, "everybody" in this sense also includes unborn human beings.

4. See burden of proof, infra p. 39.

thing and reduced to nothing what is deemed the most important law in the history of political institutions.

3. THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW, THAT "ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL," SHOWS THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" INCLUDES THE UNBORN.

Roe v. Wade violates the spirit of the law, as well as its letter. The promise that "all men are created equal" and endowed with an "unalienable" right to "life" is the guiding spirit of American law. The Supreme Court itself ruled it is the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment:

"The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of government in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life ... ' While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law ... yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than ... to secure the equality of rights which is the foundation of free government." Gulf. Colo. & S. Fe Ry v. Ellis, 165 U.S. at 159-160 (1896).

There is no real medical dispute that the unborn have been created. Reading the letter of the Constitution, the guarantee of life to "any person," in the spirit that "all" are "created equal," and "all" shall get their equal chance to live, proves that the words "any person" do include the unborn. Concerning the right to life, the unborn are the equal of anyone.

4. HISTORY SHOWS THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" DOES INCLUDE THE UNBORN.

The last time this Court attempted to imply an exception to the words "any person" was <u>Dred Scott</u> v. <u>Sandford</u>, 19 How. 393 (1857). The 13th and 14th Amendments were intended to overrule this decision that the words "any person," as used in the 5th Amendment, did not include Negroes; there was a constitutional right to own a slave; the phase "all men are created equal" did

<sup>5.</sup> The uncontradicted medical evidence in the Texas brief in Roe v. Wade showed the fetal heart begins "pulsations at 24 days"; and "brain waves have been noted at 43 days"; and the unborn child is "alive."

not include Negroes; Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories; and Negroes could not sue in federal court to see if they were slave or free.

Abraham Lincoln was a leading opponent of Dred Scott. If officials can say all men are created equal except Negroes, he asked, "where will it stop?" He denounced Dred Scott as based on "falsehood," and he alleged a conspiracy by the U.S. Supreme Court, two Presidents, and leading members of Congress, to make slavery legal everywhere and overturn the foundation of our government. Explaining why he would not obey it, President Lincoln said that Dred Scott resulted in "the rule of minority, as a permanent arrangement" which was "wholly inadmissible" and if the President were bound by Dred Scott, "the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers."

<u>Dred Scott</u> triggered a civil war, and President Lincoln defied the Court's decision, that there was a constitutional right to own a slave, when he emancipated slaves and declared them to be "forever free." He reminded us at Gettysburg that we were fighting to see whether a nation dedicated to the principle that "all men are created equal" could "long endure."

Roe v. Wads is simply another Dred

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to rededicate this nation to this original proposition. One of its framers explained:

"It establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest ... the most despised ... the same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful... Without this ... there is no republican government." Rep. Jacob Howard, quoted in 1 B. Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights 262 (1970).

The framers intended to prevent another Dred Scott catastrophe of judges ever again implying exceptions to the words "any person" to exclude anyone; they employed the universal words most suited for this purpose. And the people had already enacted criminal abortion laws to protect all stages of unborn life, showing the guarantee of life to "any person" means what it says.

Roe v. Wade is simply another Dred

Scott disaster which rests on historical
contradictions so insane that to permit it
is to confess that men cannot be governed by
truth, reason, or laws. The Court did the
most forbidden thing, and defied the
"unalienable" guarantee of life to "any
person," the two most important words ever
written into law.

The letter of the law, its spirit, its history, its presumption in favor of life, the medical facts known to the 19th century, as well as the 20th, unite to permit only one lawful conclusion: the guarantee of life to "any person" does include the unborn.

<sup>6.</sup> Roe v. Wade rests on the contradiction that without one word of explanation, the framers intended their very promise of life to all, to "any person," to sweep away all their abortion statutes, and make killings, which they had already condemned as criminal, a fundamental "liberty" ranked along with free speech. Roe v. Wade further pretends that the framers somehow silently connived to repudiate a major point of the civil war, so that, in the manner of Dred Scott, judges would be at liberty to again produce more convulsions by implying more exceptions to the words "any person."

child to be bornrarlier than its ROE V. WADE IS VOID BECAUSE IT CRIMINALLY DEFIED THE UNALIENABLE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" AND CONDEMNED TO DEATH MILLIONS OF VICTIMS WHOM THE CONSTITUTION ENDEAVORS TO PRESERVE.

situation in which it cannot live, is ROE V. WADE CRIMINALLY DEFIED THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" BECAUSE THIS COURT DECREED KILLINGS TO BE "LIBERTY" WHICH THE PEOPLE HAD DEFINED TO BE "MURDER." THE COURT DECREED "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY."

When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, an abortion was murder if the child was "born alive." And a child could be "born alive" long before the Court's arbitrary point of "viability."1

An 1859 study by the American Medical Association stated the law of murder throughout the United States:

If a person, intending to procure abortion, does an act which causes the

<sup>1.</sup> This Court arbitrarily set the point, where the law could begin to protect the unborn, at "viability" (about 7 months gestation) "because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the ... womb. " Roe v. Wade, supra, 163. The point is arbitrary, because the Court cannot explain why (in legal and medical precedent) it can be criminal to kill the unborn a few days after viability, but must be "liberty" to kill the unborn a few days before. The Court invented it.

child to be born earlier than its natural time, and therefore in a state much less capable of living, and it afterwards die in consequence of such premature exposure, the person who by this misconduct brings the child into the world, and puts it into a situation in which it cannot live, is guilty of murder.

Yet in 1973, without any investigation of the law of murder, the Court decreed this very killing to be "liberty" which the American people had universally defined to be "murder." In plainest terms, the Supreme Court decreed: "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY."

A. THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW WAS THE LAW OF THE LAND IN COLONIAL AMERICA

America's first settlement at

Jamestown followed the English common law,
as did other colonies. The common law

defined an abortion in which a "quick"

(about 4 months gestation) child died after
being "born alive" to be "murder." 3 so if

<sup>2.</sup> Reported in A.S. Taylor, A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence 462 (6th ed. 1866). He described the AMA report as "a complete and comprehensive exhibit of laws of each of the United States." Id., at 460.

<sup>3.</sup> Coke, 3 Inst. 50; Hawkins, 1 Hawkins Ch. 13, s. 16; Blackstone, 4 Bl. Com. 198.

"viable"), Coke said the abortion is "o horrible an offense" and "this is murder."

Regina v. West involved this very abortion of a quick, but pre-viable child:

"The prisoner is charged with murder; and the means stated are, that the prisoner caused the premature delivery ... by using some instrument for the purpose of procuring abortion; and that the child so prematurely born was, in consequence of its premature birth, so weak that it died.

"A medical witness stated ... that it was a healthy child; but that, being born at that period of gestation, it was impossible that it could live any considerable length of time separated from the womb of the mother. It was incapable of maintaining a separate and independent existence." Regina v. West, 2 C & K 784, 786-788 (1848).

Although not yet viable, the judge cited Coke and instructed the jury that if the child were "born alive," the abortion was

<sup>4.</sup> Coke, 3 Inst. 50. "This work is executed with so much learning and judgment, that I do not recollect that a single position in it has ever been judicially denied....(I)t may still be considered as the fundamental code of the English law." 14 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 57 (Bergh ed. 1907). Jefferson was an authority on colonial law, serving on the 1776 committee which adapted Virginia's laws to republican form, the common law being assigned to him.

murder. 6 The English writers cited this as the correct statement of the law. 7

Thus Roe v. Wade decreed killings to be "liberty" which had been condemned as "murder" since earliest colonial times.

B. "BORN\_ALIYE" ABORTIONS WERE MURDER WHEN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS ADOPTED.

The English common law is the dictionary which courts use to construe the state and federal homicide statutes. 8

By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, American legal authorities had

<sup>6.</sup> Regina v. West, 2 C & K at 788: "I am of opinion (and I direct you in point of law), that if a person intending to procure abortion does an act which causes a child to be born so much earlier than the natural time, that it is born in a state much less capable of living, and afterwards dies in consequence of its exposure to the external world, the person who by her misconduct so brings the child into the world, and puts it thereby in a situation in which it cannot live, is guilty of murder."

<sup>7. 1</sup> J.F. Archbold, A Complete Treatise on Criminal Procedure, Pleading and Evidence 783 (Waterman Am. ed. 7th ed. 1860); 1 W.O. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors 671-672 (4th ed. 1865).

<sup>8.</sup> Clarke v. State, 117 Ala, 1 (1898); Hamilton v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 382 (1905).

long followed the common law rule that abortions of pre-viable children "born alive" were murder. In 1858 the preeminent legal writer of the 19th century explained:

"If a person intending to procure abortion, does an act which causes a [quick] child to be born so much earlier than the natural time, that it is born in a state much less capable of living, and afterwards dies, in consequence of its exposure to the external world, the person who by this misconduct, so brings the child into the world, and puts it thereby in a situation in which it cannot live, is guilty of murder"

F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Homicide in the United States 93 (1855).

This was the uncontradicted view in the United States when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. 9 Courts applied this law of murder. 10 It was still the law in 1973. 11 In 1975 the New Jersey courts

<sup>9. 2</sup> J.P. Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law 365 (4th ed. 1868); A.S. Taylor, supra, 462, 517.

<sup>10.</sup> Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1 (1898). "In Georgia ... the wilful killing of an unborn child so far developed as to be ... called 'quick,' is considered as murder." Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E. 2d 100, 102 (1955).

<sup>11.</sup> R. Perkins, Criminal Law 30 n.17 (2d ed 1969).

applied this 17th century murder law to the killing of a pre-viable fetus born alive:

That a fetus may be the victim of murder if it be born alive has long been a part of our common law....Coke, Institutes 58 (1648).

For almost four centuries governments came and went, but the law that born alive abortions are murder, which is binding on the U.S. Supreme Court, 13 remained the law of the land.

Thus Roe v. Wade decreed killings to be "liberty" which had been universally condemned by the framers and adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment to be "murder."

C. THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON"
INCLUDES CHILDREN GUARDED BY THE MURDER LAW

The guarantee of life to "any person" in the Fourteenth Amendment must include

<sup>12.</sup> State v. Anderson, 343 A. 2d 505, 508 (1975), affirmed 413 A. 2d 611 (1980). The courts rejected the claim it was not murder because "the infants were never capable of maintaining a separate and independent existence." Id. at 615.

<sup>13.</sup> Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court must accept the construction given by a state to its own statute.

Pollard v. Dwight, 4 Cranch 421, 429.

all persons whose lives were protected by the law of murder when the Amendment was adopted. No dispute is even possible.

defined to be murder in 1868, it is certain that the framers did not intend to exclude Jews from the guarantee of life to "any person" so it would be "liberty" to kill Jews with impunity from criminal laws.

Changing the names of the victims does not change the legal result.

The people who framed and adopted the Amendment had condemned the taking of a crying, pre-viable infant from its mother's womb to be murder. Thus it is certain that they did not intend to exclude the lives of these children from the guarantee of life to "any person" so it would be "liberty" to kill them with impunity from murder laws.

By arbitrarily setting "viability" as the point the law could begin to protect unborn life, the Court decreed the same

killing to be "liberty" which the American people had condemned as "murder."

The words "any person" do indisputably include children protected by the law of murder. And since personhood under the Constitution does not just fade away with time, like some magic disappearing ink, the right to life of these children is still guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

D. ROE V. WADE ALLOWS HYSTEROTOMY ABORTIONS

Roe v. Wade hysterotomy abortions, basically Caesareans, result in children "born alive." As explained to Congress:

With few exceptions, babies aborted by this method will all move, will all breathe, and some will cry.... Almost all were born alive.

<sup>14.</sup> Jeffries and Edmonds, Abortion: The Dreaded Complication, Philadelphia Inquirer, August 2, 1981.

<sup>15.</sup> Hearings on Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, before subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 46, Part 1, at 397 (1976) (statement by Dr. John Willke, M.D.). There are about 140,000 second stage abortions each year. Washington Post, April 26, 1985, All. Most methods can result in a child born alive.

When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, these hysterotomy abortions were murder. Thus the lives of the children are still guaranteed by the Amendment, and the killings are still murder.

# F. THE DECREE "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY" OVERTHROWS THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Is a government of laws founded upon evidence, or the mere naked decrees of men holding office for life? The evidence proves that the lives of these children are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

This evidence for the unborn is exactly the same evidence which many people must rely upon to prove their lives are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 16 If

<sup>16.</sup> Suppose it were claimed in federal court that it is "liberty" to kill the insane, or invalids, or Jews. What factual, non-argumentative evidence could be found to establish their right to life under the U.S. Constitution?

As with the unborn, it would do no good to object that no one ever heard of a "liberty" to kill them - or to object that such killings had thereto been criminal.

The Amendment merely states that it protects the life of "any person." So, as with the unborn, it does not expressly

then the Roe v. Wade precedent can grow to a "liberty" to kill virtually anyone. If the Supreme Court decreed it "liberty" to kill Jews, this same evidence would prove it "murder," and not "liberty." Judges may have more sympathy for other victims, but changing the names of the victims will not change the legal result.

Roe v. Wade murders reason itself. In his novel, "1984," Orwell described how a tyranny defrauded its subjects into obedience with the "doublethink" slogan "FREEDOM IS SLAVERY." Although this science fiction appears improbable, the U.S. Supreme Court has defrauded the United

refer to them; and its legislative history does not appear to expressly refer to them.

The principle that all people are "created" equal, with an "unalienable" right to "life," having been sneered out of court in Roe v. Wade, now provides no assurance for anyone.

As with the unborn, the murder laws don't expressly refer to the insane, or invalids, or Jews; the intention of the legislators is found in the common law.

If the evidence cannot protect the unborn, the lives of many are imperiled.

States into obedience with the ultimate falsehood: "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY."

Abraham Lincoln ridiculed <u>Dred Scott</u>
by reducing it to its plainest terms:

[We hold these truth to be selfevident, that] all men are created equal - except Negroes. That if any one man, choose to enslave another, no third man shall be allowed to object.

The Fourteenth Amendment intended to prevent this forever. Yet Roe v. Wade, reduced to its plainest terms, asserts:

We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created
equal - except those created to be
murdered.
That if any one man, choose to murder
another, no third man shall be allowed

By changing the names of the victims, the Supreme Court has duplicated the decree of "the supreme judge" of Nazi Germany who asserted the killing of Jews to be legal. 17

to object.

<sup>17.</sup> United States v. Altstoetter, 3 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals 1011-1014 (1951). The Nazi judges claimed that they could not be held accountable for complicity in extermination and murder, since they had acted "within the authority" of the "decrees" of "the supreme judge." Id. at

The key doctrines of the Nazi judiciary have been adopted by the courts of the United States: a "supreme judge" which decrees mass murder to be legal; and lower judges who rule they must blindly obey. 18

The Court did exactly what the guarantee of life to "any person" was intended to prevent, and decreed murder to be legal, by giving "murder" the new name "liberty." But Chief Justice Marshall condemned such sham:

"Is the proposition to be maintained that the Constitution meant to prohibit names and not things? That a very important act, big with great and ruinous mischief which is expressly forbidden by words most appropriate for its description; may be performed by the substitution of a name? That the Constitution, in one of its most important provisions, may be evaded by giving a new name to an old

<sup>983-85.</sup> Their "supreme judge" had decreed killings to be legal which had been defined by statute to be criminal. But the tribunal held, "The dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist."

<sup>18.</sup> Ernest v. U.S. Attorney etc., cert. denied 475 U.S. 1084 (1986). The U.S. District Judge ruled that Rog v. Wade was "the worst decision by the Supreme Court in the history of the Court." But he stated that even if the Supreme Court decreed it liberty to kill Jews, he must obey and permit the killings to continue.

thing? We cannot think so." Craig v. Missouri, 3 Pet. at 433 (1830).

Thus the United States is ruled by the decree "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY." But murder is still murder, no matter what new name the Court gives it. This is the most catastrophic crime in history. This precedent of judicial alchemy to convert murder into "liberty" can be evoked at whim to kill anyone; it cancels the "unalienable" guarantee of life and makes everybody a mere hostage of this Court; it is a virtual murder gun held to everyone's head - all life now depends merely on judicial whim; it defies the consent of the governed; it smashes the hopes of the whole human race for government by truth and laws, and reduces government to the mere matter of which murderer can grab power and be obeyed. Again people must struggle to ensure that the nation dedicated to the proposition that "all men are created equal" shall not "perish from this earth."

And in those few 2. tates still

ROE v. WADE CRIMINALLY DEPIED THE UNALIENABLE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" BECAUSE THIS COURT FABRICATED EVIDENCE TO FALSELY IMPLY THAT THE WORDS "ANY PERSON" DO NOT INCLUDE THE UNBORN.

The 19th century abortion statutes supplanted the medieval view that unborn-life began at "quickening" and expanded protection of law to all stages of unborn life; they prove the guarantee of life to "any person" includes the unborn, that no distinction can be made among the stages of unborn life.

When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, over three-fourths of the ratifying states had already made abortion at any stage of gestation a crime. Within a few years, these statutes were universal.

<sup>1. &</sup>quot;Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual: and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as the infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." 1 Bl. Com. 126.

The statutes are set out in Quay, Justifiable Abortion, Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 Geo. L. J. 447-520 (1961).

And in those few States still following the common law, judicial revision makes it impossible for this Court to assert with any assurance that it was any different than the prevailing statutes:

By the ancient common law ... as the life of an infant was not supposed to begin until it stirred in the mother's womb, it was not regarded as a criminal offense to commit an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. A considerable change in the law has taken place in many jurisdictions by the silent and steady progress of judicial opinion; and it has been frequently held by Courts of high character that abortion is a crime at common law without regard to the stage of gestation.

And those state supreme courts which ruled that abortion prior to quickening was not a common law crime were immediately

<sup>3.</sup> Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524 (1887). Some state supreme courts rejected medieval medical views and ruled that the common law made abortion at any stage of gestation a crime. Mills v. Comm., 13 Pa. 631 (1850); State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 544 (1880); State v. Reed, 45 Ark. 333 (1885).

Wharton, a standard 19th century text, stated that under common law "the protection of the law was cast round an unborn child from its first stage of ascertainable existence, no matter whether 'quickening' had taken place or not." F. Wharton and M. Stille, Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence 927-28 (2d ed. 1860).

The theory of a "liberty" to kill the unborn faced a fatal contradiction. How could the Court dare to <u>Dred Scott</u>-like imply an exception to the guarantee of life to "any person" in order to declare killings to be "liberty" which the people had defined to be criminal? This absurd contradiction wrecks <u>Roe</u> v <u>Wade</u>.

To resolve this fatal contradiction
the Court fabricated the hypothesis that
the 19th century criminal abortion statutes
were not intended to protect unborn life,
but were only intended to protect the
mother. This falsely implied that the
people never intended the lives of the
unborn to be protected by law. This false
hypothesis was fabricated as follows.

overruled by their legislatures which made abortion at any stage of pregnancy a crime. Comm. v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263 (1945), was immediately overruled by Mass. Acts & Resolves ch. 27 (1845). State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (1849), was immediately overruled by N.J. Laws at 266 (1849). Abrahams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274 (1856) was overruled by the next legislature, Iowa Rev. Laws, tit. XXIII, ch. 165. art. 2, sec. 4221 (1860).

The Court first asserted as fact:

"When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 148.

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The only authority cited was a 20th century medical history book. But this book only described the hazards of major surgery in general prior to Lister's discovery of antiseptics; the abortion operation was not mentioned anywhere in the entire book.

The 19th century obstetric authorities throughout the Western world prove that abortions by physicians were "perfectly safe" to the woman. They prove the Court's assertion of fact to be false.

<sup>4.</sup> Haagensen and Lloyd, A Hundred rears of Medicine 19 (1943), cited in Roe v. Wade, supra, at 148 n.43.

<sup>5. 2</sup> T. Denman, M.D., An Introduction to the Practice of Midwifery 96 (1802). He was a standard English authority. They based their judgments on their own experience in performing abortions, and from hundreds of cases reported from around the world. In addition to perforation, other procedures were also safe. A French physician wrote "experience has proved that the dangers of the operation are reduced to a small

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were also safe. A reach physician wrote "experience has graved that the dangers of the operation are reduced to a small

The Supreme Court never revealed the "hazardous" abortion "procedure" to which it was referring. Actually, the 19th century physicians generally used the ancient method, 6 which one physician traced back 2000 years, 7 and which they described as "perfectly safe" to woman.

The Court did not examine even one

19th century obstetric textbook; and they
prove its assertion, "the procedure was a
hazardous one for the woman," to be false.

Since abortion was not dangerous to the life of the mother, the only motivating

matter." A.L.M. Velpeau, M.D., A Complete Treatise on Midwifery 530 (4th Am. ed. 1852). The preeminent American physician wrote "to the mother there is very little danger." H.L. Hodge, M.D., The Principles and Practice of Obstetrics 293 (1864).

6. Dr. Denman, a standard authority in England, wrote in 1802: "the membranes of the ovum are punctured," which permitted "the discharge of the waters," which induced the "action of the uterus," which resulted in the expulsion of the fetus from the womb, which was "perfectly safe" to the woman. 2 Denman, supra, at 96-99.

<sup>7.</sup> F. Ramsbotham, M.D., The Principles and Practice of Obstetric Medicine 724 (4th ed. 1856).

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T. F. Ramphotham, c.D., The Principles and

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purpose the abortion statutes could have had was to protect the lives of the unborn from destruction by abortions, even safe abortions by physicians. Had it been the purpose of the legislators to only protect the mother, they would have simply required abortions, which were known all over the western world to be safe to the mother, to be performed only by physicians.

The Court next asserted: "Abortion mortality was high."8 This is asserted as fact. The Court cited no authority to support it. The 19th century obstetric authorities prove this assertion to be false; their medical texts show that the abortion operation was "perfectly safe."

The purpose of the Court's false assertion of fact is to go beyond the mere theory that abortion was hazardous to the mother, and infer that the carnage was so

<sup>8.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 149.

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great as to call for legislation to protect women from the medical profession.

individually pr C. . A.P. Wherton, S Upon these two false assertions of fact, the Court next falsely inferred:

"[A] State's real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 149.

This is a false inference, drawn from two false assertions of fact. Moreover, the 19th century treatises on criminal law expressly stated that these abortion statutes were intended to supplant the ancient common law and protect the lives of the unborn during all stages of gestation:

"The notion that a man is not accountable for destroying the child before it quickens, arose from the hypothesis that quickening was the commencement of vitality with it, before which it could not be considered as existing. This "absurd distinction" ... is now exploded in medicine .... The foetus is certainly ... as much a living being immediately after conception, as at any other time before delivery.

"There is as much vitality ... on one side of quickening as on the other, and ... the infant is as much entitled to

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protection ... a week before it quickens as a week afterwards.... Acting under these views, the legislatures ... passed acts making ante-quickening-foeticide individually penal." I F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 656-57 (5th.ed. 1861).

There is no 19th century authority to the contrary. If the purpose of these laws had been to protect the mother, and not the child, these texts would certainly have noted such an important thing.

And State supreme courts ruled that these statutes protected the unborn:

"(T)he statute ... essentially changed the common law. There is a removal of the unsubstantial distinction, that it is no offense to procure an abortion, before the mother becomes sensible of the motion of the child, notwithstanding it is then capable of inheriting an estate... It is now equally criminal to produce abortion before and after quickening."

Smith v. State, 33 Me 48 (1851).

Since abortions by physicians were known all over the western world to be safe to the mother, the motivating purpose of these abortion laws could only have been to protect the lives of unborn children from destruction from abortions. That

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legislatures prohibited safe abortions by physicians, despite the great danger to the mother from abortions by criminals, shows their great respect for unborn life.

D.

The Court next made its irrelevant

study of the single word "person," and held

it "does not include the unborn":

"(O) ur observation ... that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158.

The Court could not find even one 19th century authority to support this result; the whole weight rests on the Court's "major portion - far freer" assertion, which is false. 10 The reverse is closer to

<sup>9. &</sup>quot;In thirty-four cases of criminal abortion ... twenty-two were followed...by death, and only twelve were not. In fifteen cases necessarily induced by physicians, not one was fatal." H.R. Storer, M.D., On Criminal Abortion in America 43 (1860)

<sup>10.</sup> The ancient common law only prevailed in the early 19th century. By mid-century, a majority of the States which ratified the Amendment had already enacted statutes

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the truth. The evidence indicates that legal abortion was far freer in 1973, than when the Amendment was adopted. 11

The Court's "major portion - far freer" doctrine, were it even true, is absurdly irrelevant 2 and ominously skirts

theory that life begre at "quickering." A

which punished abortion throughout gestation. (Supra n.2) By 1868, over three-fourths had enacted such statutes; and shortly they were universal. In those few states with no statute, this Court cannot claim with assurance that the common law was any different. (Supra n.3) Thus the "prevailing law" for the last half of the 19th century; it was about the same as existed in most states in 1973; and "legal" abortion was not "far freer" then.

11. The statutes listed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 140 n37, show that by 1973 four states permitted abortion on demand, while fourteen permitted abortions for other reasons not allowed in 1868. The statutes prevailing in 1868 only permitted abortions to save the life of the mother or child. Thus legal abortion was far freer in 1973 than in 1868, although in most states it was still about the same as it was in 1868.

12. The same thing could be said about "legal slavery," which really was "far freer" for the "major portion" of the 19th century than it is today. Would this prove a right to own a slave today? If the Court could ignore the events of 1860 to 1866 - it could plausibly reaffirm its <a href="Dred Scott">Dred Scott</a> rule that there was a right to own a slave.

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the central issue of the law existing in 1868, and the reason for the vast change.

The Court's assertion that "legal abortion" was then "far freer" refers to the ancient common law that abortion prior to "quickening" was not a crime, on the theory that life began at "quickening." A physician, who helped draft Virginia's 1848 abortion statute, explained its purpose was to supplant this "exploded error":

"(T) hat the embryo is endowed with an inherent vitality from the first moment of conception, and is therefore as much entitled to the protection of the law before the period of 'quickening' as after it, every well-informed physician must yield a ready assent. The old doctrine, once held by medical men ... that the foetus first becomes animated, or endowed with distinct vitality, at the moment when the sensation of quickening is experienced by the mother, has been long since banished from the domain of science ... and now only finds a retreat in the dark and ancient caverns of the common law.

<sup>&</sup>quot;(T)he civil rights of the unborn child are perfect from the very commencement of its being." L.S. Joynes, M.D., "Foetus in Utero," Virginia Medical Journal 179-180, 187 (1856).

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13. Mills v. Commonwealth, supra, 632.

The 19th century medical and legal authorities, with none to the contrary, condemned this ancient theory of life:

"(I)t is the duty of every accoucheur earnestly to protest against the ancient theological and legal opinion that, prior to the fourth month, the embryo had no proper existence.... (T)he merest tyro in physiological investigations must be convinced of the falsity of all such opinions." H.L. Hodge, M.D., The Principles and Practice of Obstetrics 78 (1864).

Yet the Court exactly adopted, as constitutional law, a view of unborn life which the 1860 president of the AMA called "a barbarous physiology" and which courts ruled "never ought to have been the law anywhere," and which 19th century legislatures condemned as criminal. The AMA president said in urging States to protect all stages of unborn life:

"This relic of a barbarous physiology needs to be exploded, and the truth should be generally promulgated, that, from the moment of conception, a new being is engendered." 13 Transaction of the American Medical Association 56-57 (1860).

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13. Hills v- Epuspayealth, supra, 632.

The abortion statutes were urged by

America's most eminent medical professors

and physicians, and they were intended to

protect all stages of unborn life:

From the moment of fecundation, the new being becomes independent ... its individuality is complete.... (T) here is a progressive ... advancing from one degree of perfection to another. Every protection, therefore, which is extended by human legislation to the young infant ... should be equally effectual in securing the life of the embryo from the earliest period of its existence.

The abortion statutes show the universal guarantee of life to "any person" was not based on "a barbarous physiology"; the Amendment recognizes that there is no time during unborn life that a rational line can be drawn to permit the killings.

But the Court accepted the medieval view, that life began at "quickening"

<sup>14.</sup> H.L. Hodge, M.D., The Principles and Practice of Obstetrics 78 (1864). Hodge's "name had become a household word throughout the land" and his book "valued among the very first works on obstetrics ever issued from the American or foreign press." R. Penrose, M.D., Discourse on Life of H.L. Hodge 20-21 (1872)

The abortlos statutes were orged by America a mont eminont medical professors and physicians, and they were intended to protect all styces of unborn like ast ... . snebnegebnt senoped phied wen andividuality to complete... (1) Bere As a progressive ... evisionory a st . Ted form of noiseling to sersel and extended by hugen leader action to the affectual in negating the life of the all lo bolyed implifies edd, mayl owners quarantes of life to "any person" was not But the Court accepted the medieval wiew, that life began at "quickening" it. Hal. Rodge, M.b., The Dringing and "name had been a second to been

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(about 4 months), and arbitrarily enlarged it to "viability" (about 7 months), making a "liberty" to kill which even its only authority, the ancient common law, condemned as criminal. Thus the basis of the Court's decree that "the word 'person'... does not include the unborn." Thus 20th century constitutional law was founded on medieval medical theory which was rejected as false in the 19th century, and remains false today.

In short, the Court manufactured a constitutional right to kill, out of "an exploded error" that an ante-quick child was not alive, which the "merest tyro" knew to be false, and was universally condemned as "a barbarous physiology" found only in "dark and ancient caverns," which 19th century judges ruled "never ought to have been the law anywhere," and which legislatures condemned as criminal everywhere, in order to <u>Dred Scott</u>-like blast an exception to the guarantee of life to "any person," so

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with impunity from criminal statutes. This is not law; it is murder under ruse of law.

The Court's arbitrary shopping among medieval notions, rejected by the framers as "barbarous," to define the unalienable guarantee of life to "any person," is a another murder gun precedent pointed at the head of all Americans; it makes everyone a hostage of this Court; judges can arbitrarily pull its trigger to destroy anyone.

tens of millions of victims could be killed

The Court now has bloody precedent for doing the most forbidden act; it directly defied the unalienable guarantee of life to "any person," the two most important words ever written into law, and condemned to death millions of victims whom the U.S. Constitution endeavors to preserve. It can now happen to anyone; the Court has cancelled the "unalienable" guarantee of life to "ALL," and sealed it in blood.

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In construing its equivalent word "everybody," the Supreme Court of West Germany ruled it did include the unborn:

"No distinction can be made among the several stages of developing life before birth, or between prenatal and postnatal life." [Supra page 3 n.3]

The history of the criminal abortion statutes proves the framers made this same conclusion when they universally guaranteed life to "any person" without any exceptions: there is no time during unborn life that the law can withdraw its protection and permit the killings; rather it is the duty of the law to protect the weak.

Without need of assistance from Chief Justice John Marshall's burdens of proof, as described in the next section, history permits only one rational conclusion: the universal and "unalienable" guarantee of life to "any person" includes the unborn during all stages of unborn existence.

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THIS COURT CRIMINALLY DEFIED THE UNALIENABLE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" WHEN IT DEFIED THE RULINGS OF JOHN MARSHALL AND USED A "GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT" BURDEN OF PROOF TO INFER THAT THE WORDS "ANY PERSON" DO NOT INCLUDE THE UNBORN.

The Court used the correct burden when it previously construed "any person." Yet when it came to the unborn, it used a "guilty until proven innocent" burden.

A.
THE BURDENS, DESCRIBED BY CHIEF JUSTICE
MARSHALL, PROVE THE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO
"ANY PERSON" DOES INCLUDE THE UNBORN.

Chief Justice John Marshall described the conditions the Court must satisfy to lawfully imply an exception to universal terms in the U.S. Constitution.

Before the Court can exclude the unborn from the guarantee of life to "any

<sup>1.</sup> The Court properly ruled that the words "any person" included Chinese aliens, saying the words are "universal in their application, to all persons ... without regard to any differences." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). And this Court was so sure that the words "any person" included "corporations," it refused to even allow counsel to argue against it. Santa Clara v. So. Pac. RR, 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).

person," so they can be killed with impunity from criminal laws, the Court must prove that including the unborn within the terms "any person" would be "so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application." 2

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The Court must prove that if the right to life of the unborn had "been suggested [to the framers] the language would have been so varied, as to exclude it," and the

<sup>2.</sup> Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202-203 (1819). When the Constitution uses universal words, and a case is "within the very words of the Constitution," it would be "dangerous in the extreme" to infer the case "is not within its spirit" because "we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say" unless the "absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application."

<sup>3.</sup> Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 644-45 (1819). "It is not enough to say that this particular case was not in the mind of the Convention, when the article was framed, nor of the American people, when it was adopted. It is necessary to go farther, and to say that, had this particular case been suggested, the language would have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception. The case being within

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pouple, when it was adopted, it is necessary to go farther, and to say that, had this particular case been suggested,

to exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception. The case being within

framers would have changed the guarantee to read: "Nor shall any state deprive any person, except unborn persons, of life ... without due process of law."

These are the burdens which protect
the lives of all Americans from government
sanctioned extermination, as happened in
Nazi Germany; they carry the life of each
American in their hands. The Court bears
the heaviest burden of proof to imply an
exception to the guarantee of life to "any
person" so millions of victims can be
killed with impunity from criminal laws. 4

the words of the rule, must be within its operation likewise, unless there be something in the literal construction so obviously absurd ... as to justify those who expound the constitution in making it an exception."

The Court used these burdens when it ruled it could not read its jurisdiction, which includes "all cases" arising under the Constitution, as if it merely said "some cases." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. at 339 (1816).

4. The truth of this extraordinary burden can be demonstrated by applying it to various cases. Before the Court could imply an exception to the universal terms "any person," so that Jews could be deliberately

framers would have changed the quarantee to read: "Mon shall any state deprive any parame, except undere persons, of life ... without due process of law." These are the burdens which protect the lives of all americans from government manctioned extermination, as bappened in the neadlest burden of proof to imply an exception to the quarantee of life to "any reled it could not read its jurisdiction, the Caltileusion, as if it secoly said "some caces." Cobens v. Virulais, 6 Micab Wheat, at 319 (1816). A. The truth of this extraordinary borden os il polyloga yo bedardanoseb ed neb various cases. Before the Court could imply an exception to the universal terms "any

Chief Justice Marshall's rules prove
the guarantee of life to "any person" does
include the unborn because "all mankind"
would not unite "without hesitation" to
exclude them. And the framers would not
have changed the guarantee to read "any
person - except the unborn," so it would be
liberty to kill them, because the people
had already enacted criminal statutes to
protect the lives of the unborn by law.
Thus the guarantee of life to "any person"
does include the unborn.

killed with impunity from criminal laws, the Court would have to prove that "the absurdity and injustice" of including Jews within the universal terms "any person" would be "so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application." And the Court must prove that if the case of the Jews had been suggested to the framers, they would have changed the Amendment to read: "No state shall deprive any person, except Jews, of life without due process of law." This same burden protects us all.

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THIS COURT EXACTLY DEFIED THE BURDEN
DESCRIBED BY CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL.

Instead of placing the burden on the advocates of the killings to prove that including the unborn within the guarantee of life to "any person" would "be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application," the Court reversed the burden:

First, the Court declared a "liberty"
to kill the unborn with impunity from
criminal laws, before it even looked to see
if the guarantee of life to "any person"
included the unborn. 5

Second, subsequently, the Court looked to see if the guarantee of life to "any person" included the unborn.

<sup>5.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153: "(T)he Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision ... to terminate her pregnancy."

<sup>6.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-157. "The appellee ... argue that the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."

THIS COURT MEACELY DEFIED THE BURDEN DESCRIBED BY CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL. Instead of placing the burden on the

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S. Ene vi Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-157, "The appealies ... arque that the fetus is a

'person' within the language and meaning of

Third, the Court admitted that if the words "any person" included the unborn, its predetermined assertion of a "liberty" to kill the unborn "of course, collapses."

But the Court decreed a "liberty" to kill the unborn before it looked to see if the unborn had a "quaranteed" right to live.

Thus the Court had passed its sentence of death, before it even looked to see if the Constitution guaranteed a right to live. It is analogous to a court sentencing an accused to be hung before it even heard the evidence. As Alice's Queen demanded: "Sentence first; verdict afterwards."

So it was in Roe v. Wade - first the sentence of death; then the verdict whether the law allowed the victim to live.

<sup>7.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-157: "If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment."

<sup>8.</sup> The vengeful Queen in "Alice in Wonderland" shouted "Off with her head" and when admonished that the jury must first consider its verdict, she said: "No! No! Sentence first- verdict afterwards."

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predetermining a "liberty" to kill the unborn, was not only to shift the burden of proof from the advocates of the killings onto the unborn, but also to impose its heaviest "compelling" burden on the unborn, a burden of proof so devastating that state statutes seldom, if ever, survive it.

Pifth, the Court stated that the evidence did not prove "with any assurance" that the guarantee of life to "any person" included the unborn. 10 This confirms that the Court placed the burden on the unborn to prove with "assurance" that the words "any person" included the unborn. This is the heaviest burden which can be imagined.

<sup>9.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155: "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest.'" As its compelling state interest, Texas claimed that the lives of the unborn were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 156.

<sup>10.</sup> Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157. "Assurance" means: "To make certain and put beyond doubt." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968).

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compelling meate interest, Texas claimed

by the Fourtmenth Amendment, 1d., at 156.

10. Hos W. Made, 410 U.S. at 157.

beyond doubt." Black's Law Mickienary (4th

Finally, by calling upon its false evidence to raise trifling doubts, the Court said that the unborn had not met their burden of proof and ruled "the word 'person' ... does not include the unborn."

If the Court used such burdens to decree a "liberty" to kill Jews, surely none would deny it would be murder. Judges may have more sympathy for other victims, but changing the name of the victims will not change the legal result.

When courts use such burdens to condemn victims to death, it can no longer be pretended it is still the government of the United States - any government of laws. This is still another "murder gun" precedent pointed at the head of every American; judges can arbitrarily use it to destroy anyone. The true burden proves beyond dispute that the guarantee of life to "any person" does include the unborn.

4.

ROE V. WADE CRIMINALLY DEFIED THE UNALIEN-ABLE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" BECAUSE THIS COURT USED "IRON CURTAIN" PROCEDURES TO IMPLY THAT THE WORDS "ANY PERSON" DO NOT INCLUDE THE UNBORN; IT USED THESE PROCEDURES TO MAINTAIN ITS KILLINGS.

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The Court effected Roe v. Wade by using unconstitutional "iron curtain" procedures in a mock trial without truth.

- 1. A. Denial of Assistance of Counsel Counsel did not especially represent the unborn in the U.S. District Court in Roe v. Wade. And the U.S. Supreme Court denied a request by an original party to allow counsel to especially represent the unborn and defend their right to life. Thus, counsel did not represent the unborn at any stage of the original proceedings.
- B. Denial of Prior Notice The District Court did not even look to see if the lives of the unborn were protected by the U.S. Constitution; this question was argued for the first time after Roe v. Wade reached the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court gave the parties no prior notice of the constitutional standards, or the burdens of proof, or the evidence, which the Court used to infer that the lives of the unborn were not protected by the U.S. Constitution. The first time the parties had notice was when Roe v. Wade was published, and the victims were already condemned to death. An original party objected that it lacked the prior notice needed to defend the unborn.
- C. Secret Evidentiary Proceedings
  The Court used some secret evidentiary
  process, not open to the parties, to find

POR V. MADE CRIMINALLY DEPIED THE UNALIEN-ARLS GOMEANTER OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" RECAUSE THIS COURT DEED "INCH CURTAIN" PROCEDURES TO IMPLY THAT THE WORDS "ANY PERSON" DO NOT INCLUDE THE UNBORN; IT USED THESE PROCEDURES TO MAINTAIN ITS KILLINGS.

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condermed to death. An original party objected that it lacked the pulor notice needed to darend the unborn.

The Court used nome secret avidentiary process, not open to the parties, to find

And the Court maintains its killings by using "iron curtain" procedures in mock trials without truth, despite continual objection that the Court was using criminal procedures to maintain its killings:

1. The Supreme Court willfully refuses to allow retained (no cost to taxpayers) counsel to represent the victims being

evidence to infer that the lives of the unborn were not protected by the U.S. Constitution. An original party objected that the Court's facts were "unknown to the parties" and it never had opportunity to cross-examine the Court's evidence.

D. Denial of Right to Cross-Examine
An original party asked permission to
cross-examine the evidence which the Court
used to infer that the lives of the unborn
were not protected by the Constitution.
Since the Court found its evidence in
secret proceedings, the parties had not
previously seen the evidence. But the
Supreme Court would not allow its evidence
to be cross-examined.

E. Denial of Right to Present Evidence
An original party asked permission to
present evidence under the new
constitutional standards, which it had not
seen before, to show that the lives of the
unborn are protected by the Constitution.
But the Court refused to allow it. And thus
the killings commenced.

And the Court materialns its allithon

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killed and defend their right to life.2

2. The Supreme Court willfully refuses to allow its evidence in Roe v. Wade, which it used to infer that "the word 'person'...

2. Some of the cases are: Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 437 U.S. 902; Anders v. Ployd, 440 U.S. 445, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 439 U.S. 890; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 439 U.S. 1065; Ashcroft v. Freiman, affirmed 440 U.S. 941, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied, 440 U.S. 941; United States v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 444 U.S. 1030; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 445 U.S. 941; H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 445 U.S. 959; Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 458 U.S. 1104; Planned Parenthood of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, motion to allow counsel to for the unborn denied 458 U.S. 1104; Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, 462 U.S. 416, motion to allow counsel to for the unborn denied 458 U.S. 1104; Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 473 U.S. 932; Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 473 U.S. 931; Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 98 L Ed 2d 478 (1988), motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 479 U.S. 1003.

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motion to allow commact for the unborn denied 439 U.S. 1065; Auderoit v. Fishens

counsel for the unbord demied, 440 0.5.

376, motion to allow counsel for the unborn denied 446 U.S. 1030; Harris v. Horse, 446 U.S. 287, motion to allow counsel for the

unborn denied 445 U.S. 941; Hala v. Mathegon, 650 U.S. 398, morton to allow

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Conscioning, 476 U.S. 747, sorton to allow counsel for the embern denied 473

476 (1988), motion to allow countel top the

does not include the unborn," to be confronted and cross-examined. 3

3. The Supreme Court willfully refuses to allow evidence to be presented to show that the Constitution's unalienable guarantee of life to "any person" includes the unborn.

These are basically the procedures cited by the Nuremberg Court as part of the evidence to convict the Nazi judges of complicity in extermination and murder. 5

The Supreme Court's own rulings on due process of law show these procedures to be

- 3. See cases, supra note 2.
- 4. See cases, supra note 2.
- 5. "The trials ... did not approach even a semblance of ... justice. The accused ... were denied the right to introduce evidence, to be confronted by witnesses against them.... They were ... denied the right of counsel of their own choice .... (P) roceedings ... were secret." United States v. Altstoetter, supra, at 1046-47 (1951). "Such a mock trial is not a judicial proceeding but a murder." Id., at 1164. "The prostitution of a judicial system for the accomplishment of criminal ends involves an element of evil to the State which is not found in frank atrocities which do not sully judicial robes." Id., at 1086.

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unconstitutional, 6 and the willful use of these procedures to be criminal.

If the Court had used these procedures to decree it "liberty" to kill Jews, it

6. Even in civil proceedings (such as where loss of welfare is threatened) due process guarantees (1) prior notice of the factual and legal bases; (2) the right to assistance of counsel; (3) the right to cross-examine adverse evidence; and (4) the right to present evidence. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-271 (1970). See also, In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

Could it be possible that procedures, which could not be used to deprive a mother of welfare, could be used to exclude her from the protection of the U.S. Constitution so that she could be killed with impunity from criminal laws? This is preposterous.

The Constitution would not permit any court to condemn even one single Jew to death in a criminal case, but deny any of these procedural rights. Then neither can it permit any court to condemn all Jews in the United States to death, but deny any of these procedural rights, by calling it a civil proceeding, and decreeing the lives of all Jews are not protected by the U.S. Constitution, and it is "liberty" to kill all Jews with impunity from criminal laws.

Any victim is entitled to all the procedural protections before any court can decree that the victim's life is not protected by the Constitution, and the victim can be killed with impunity from criminal statutes.

7. "Even judges ... could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights." Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409 (1976).

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would be condemned as murder. Judges may have more sympathy for other victims, but changing the names of the victims will not change the legal result.

The Court maintains its decree "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY" by refusing to allow truth to work in its Court. No truth seeking process was left unbloodied. It is notorious that truth is not permitted to work in this Court, and that the Court falsifies history to achieve its ends. 8

The record proves the Court used "iron curtain" procedures, a mock trial without

"Court had adjourned in the real world and reconvened in Cloud Cuckooland. [The Justices] began to invent a country suited to their purposes.... They have falsified the American past ... and no one in charge seems prepared to do anything about it." T. Landers, To A Traditionalist, Mr. Ron Sounds So Good, Wall St. J., edit. page, Dec. 27, 1984.

<sup>8. &</sup>quot;The Court ... has flouted the will of the framers and substituted an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original design.... Such conduct impels one to conclude that the Justices are become a law unto themselves.... It perilously resembles ... Hitlerism." R. Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 408-12 (1977).

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8. "The Court ... has flowed the will of the france and substituted an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original design. ... Such conduct impole one to conclude that the Justices are become a law

unto themselves... It perllously remarbles ... Hitlerism: R. Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the trunched to the test world "Court lad adjourned in the real world

and reconvened to Cloud Cuckeelend. [The Justices] began to invest a country suited to their purposes... They have faintfied the American page ... and no one in charge

seems prepared to do anything about it." T. Landers, To A. Traditionalist, Mr. Ron-Sounds Sc. Good, Wall St. J., edit. page.

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truth, to do the most forbidden thing, to defy the guarantee of life to "any person" so millions of victims could be killed with impunity from criminal statutes; and the Court maintained its killings for fifteen years by using "iron curtain" procedures in mock trials without truth. In the words of the Nuremberg court, "Such a mock trial is

These procedures are still another.

"murder gun" precedent which this Court holds to the head of every American; everyone is now a hostage of this Court; judges can use this "iron curtain" process to destroy anyone. The process makes Roe v. Wade void. 9

not a judicial proceeding but a murder."

<sup>9.</sup> A more detailed description of the procedures is made in the MOTION TO ALLOW COUNSEL REPRESENT CHILDREN UNBORN AND BORN ALIVE, filed in this case, and incorporated by reference.

5.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS COMPELLED THE U.S. SUPREME COURT TO CONFESS IN COURT THAT IT IS GUILTY OF MASS MURDER, AND TO ADMIT THAT THE UNALIENABLE GUARANTEE OF LIFE TO "ANY PERSON" DOES INCLUDE THE UNBORN.

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Por the 105th time, the U.S. Supreme
Court is accused of criminally defying the
guarantee of life to "any person" and
exterminating millions of victims whom the
U.S. Constitution endeavors to preserve.

For the <u>Blst\_time</u>, the U.S. Supreme Court is accused of mass murder in violation of state and federal statutes.

For the <u>85th time</u>, this Court is accused of using criminal procedures to effect and maintain <u>Roe</u> v. <u>Wade</u> killings.

John Marshall would have called Roe v. Wade "treason to the Constitution." 1

<sup>1.</sup> Chief Justice Marshall wrote that this Court could not extend the Constitution "to objects not...contemplated by its framers."

Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. at 332. If the Court usurped such power, it would be "treason to the Constitution." Cohens v. Yirginia, 6 Wheat. at 404. By decreeing "liberty" to be the very thing which the framers had condemned to be "murder," the Court has indisputably extended the Constitution to objects not contemplated by its framers. For 15 years, "treason to the

DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS COMPELLED THE U.S. SUPPEME COURT TO COMPESS IN COURT THAT IT IS GUILTE OF MASS NURDER, AND TO ADMIT THAT THE UNALIERABLE GUARANTES OF LIPE TO "ANY PERSON" DOES INCLUDE THE UNSORN.

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But, for fifteen years, the U.S.

Supreme Court has never denied the charges,
much less attempted to prove the charges to
be false. These facts are unparalleled in
the legal history of the world.

Under this Court's own rulings, its silence year after year, while the victims

Constitution" has masqueraded as "the supreme law of the land."

The Court supplanted the Constitution as the supreme law. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "the Constitution derives its whole authority" from the consent of the governed. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. at 403. Yet, the Court now defies this consent; it simply invents a dream world and imposes it on the people by decree. A divided Congress is unable to control this Court, which results in rule by minority.

Thomas Jefferson warned that this Court was "the most dangerous" branch because judges were "installed for life, responsible to no authority (for impeachment is not even a scarecrow)"; and judges twist words to make "anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure" with judges finally becoming "despots." Thus Roe v. Wade fully explained.

People have lost faith in the simple power of facts to prove: falsehood is called truth; murder is called liberty; treason is called law. This defeat of the consent of the governed as the basis of law is the most momentous revolution in human history. The way out was shown by Abraham Lincoln, who would "call things by their right names, no matter who was offended."

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Lincoln, who would "call chings by chest

are being killed, is an admission that the charges are true. 2 In the Court's words:

"Failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question."

United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975).

The circumstances leave no doubt that due process has compelled the U.S. Supreme Court to confess that the charges are true.

<sup>2.</sup> Under the tacit confession rule, failure to deny a charge is admissible as a confession that the charge is true. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1071-1072 (Chadborn rev. 1972). "Underlying the rule is the assumption that human nature prompts an innocent man to deny false accusations and consequently a failure to deny a particular accusation tends to prove belief in the truth of the accusation." McCormick on Evidence, § 161 (1972). The Court has often affirmed this rule. "(T)he Court has consistently recognized that ... silence in the face of accusation is a relevant fact .... Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976). And the rule is ancient. As Socrates cross-examined at his trial 2400 years ago: "(Y)ou are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying?" "I may assume that your silence gives consent." Plato 41, 45 (Jowett tr. 1942).

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Your allence gives compent. Place 41,'45

First, the evidence makes it as clear as daylight why the Court is silent in the face of the charges: the charges are proved to be true. Truth cannot be proved false.

Second, the charges were made in cases filed pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that judges who "close their eyes on the Constitution" and "condemn to death those victims whom the Constitution endeavors to preserve" commit "crime."

The only Nazi to plea guilty at Nuremberg cited this law. When warned of Auschwitz, Speer wrote: "I did not investigate - for I did not want to know what was happening there.... From fear of discovering something which might have made me turn from my course, I closed my eyes." A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich 375-76

<sup>3.</sup> The Court decreed killings to be "liberty" which States had defined to be "murder." This is mere historical fact; no denial is possible. As John Marshall said, "a fact which has existed cannot be made never to have existed." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch at 167 (1803).

<sup>4.</sup> Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 179180 (1803). This correctly states the criminal law. Where there is an affirmative duty to act, the deliberate omission to do that duty, which results in death to others, can be prosecuted as homicide. Perkins, Criminal Law 604 (2nd ed. 1969).

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The Court had a legal duty to fully hear allegations that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided. The Court affirmed its duty:

"(I)ts opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported."

The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 282, 470 (1849).

Third, the Court's steadfast silence for fifteen years in the face of the scores of accusations is unparalleled in the legal history of the world; the Court cited this very circumstance as making confession by silence more trustworthy.

"Silence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation."

United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975).

Fourth, not only has the Court's silence persisted in the face of repeated accusations, but it has persisted even in (1970). This "deliberate blindness" is complicity in criminal extermination.

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the teeth of warnings that its silence was being taken as an admission that the charges are true.

Fifth, the charges described judicial crimes not surpassed in all history, that (1) judges had done the most forbidden thing, and defied the unalienable quarantee of life to "any person," the two most important words ever written into law, and criminally exterminated millions of children; (2) the United States was being ruled by the most corrupt decree which the human mind could even imagine: "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY"; (3) due process of law had compelled the judges to confess to quilt of mass murder; and (4) the judges schemed to reaffirm the legitimacy of their murders in mock trials designed to keep truth from working in all state and federal courts. 5

The parties did not ask the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade. This was done by the amicus curiae brief by the Legal Defense

<sup>5.</sup> In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade by stare decisis in a mock trial without truth.

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Fund for Unborn Children, as follows: "For the 52nd time, the U.S. Supreme Court is accused in its own court with mass murder." The amicus brief laid out the evidence, and concluded: "THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS CONFESSED IN COURT TO GUILT OF CRIMINAL EXTERMINATION, INCLUDING MASS MURDER, AND THIS IS THE LEGAL EQUIVALENT OF THE EXPRESS OVERRULING OF ROE v. WADE." But this Court responded to these arguments by saying:

And arguments continue to be made, in these cases as well, that we erred in interpreting the Constitution.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law. We respect it today, and reaffirm Roe v. Wade.

Thus, the Court's response to "arguments" that it was guilty of mass murder. When a court rules that its decree "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY" must be obeyed without a hearing or even a question, then history could not reveal a more murderous mockery of "the rule of law." The Court hid behind stare decisis in a mock trial and used this ruse of law to defraud all lower courts into obeying Roe v. Wade without question.

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Never in the legal history of the world was it more imperative to deny charges if they were untrue. Judges, under solemn legal duty to uphold the law, are accused of mass murder. The evidence is laid out in court. The judges have done the most forbidden thing, and defied the guarantee of life. Little children are being killed. The killings violate criminal statutes. Pictures of the dead are shown to the judges. But for 15 years the judges do not meet the evidence; do not prove it false.

A government of laws can permit only one conclusion to be drawn from these facts:

The U.S. Supreme Court was met in court with the truth; truth worked in the only manner in which it was permitted to work; and due process of law compelled this Court to admit, in the most emphatic manner which the mind can imagine, that the words "any person" do include the unborn.

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Any judge who closes his eyes on these facts, and chooses to take part in a national scheme to kill little children, in defiance of the guarantee of life to "any person," and criminal statutes, to maintain the decree "MASS MURDER IS LIBERTY," knows he is guilty of complicity in mass murder and criminal defiance of the Constitution.

6. Roe v. Wade asserted to legalize killings which statutes had made criminal. Since Roe v. Wade is a mistake of law, all the killings since 1973 can be prosecuted.

The ex post facto provisions of the U.S. Constitution do not apply to judicial decisions which are a mistake of law. Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1912).

The general rule is that mistake of law is no excuse for breaking the law. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 920 (2d ed. 1969).

The limited affirmative defense of reasonable reliance on an official judicial opinion, thereafter determined to be a mistake of law, does not apply to homicide cases. Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, Comments Sec. 2.04, page 138; R. Perkins, Criminal Law 928 (2d ed. 1969).

Thus, the law applied at Nuremberg applies to this case. Obedience to the orders of judicial superiors is no excuse for complicity in murder. <u>United States</u> v. <u>Altstoetter</u>, supra, at 983-985.

Perhaps judges responsible for the Roe v. Wade murders did not believe they were breaking the law. But as Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it.... It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the

Any judge who closes his eyes on these Lacte, and chooses to take part in a national scheme to kill little children, in delience of the quarantes of life to "any person, " ond external statuted, to maintain the decree "MASS MURBER' IS LIBERTY." knows orlispel of beirsezs shall at soft and millings which statuted had made original. Since Eng v. Wade is a mintake of law, all The ex post facto provisions of the decisions which are a mistake of law, mons Servine, Criwingl Law 922 (2d ed. 1969). The limited attituative defense of Perkins, Colminal baw 928 (2d ed. 1969). applies to chis came, Chedience to the orders of judicial superiors is no excuse Altaingeller, sugra, at 983+985. Perhaps judges responsible for the Ros v. Made wurdern did not believe they were breaking the law. - But as Oliver Wendell excuse for breaking it. .. It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the

In explaining how the Nazi regime got away with its monstrous crimes, Winston Churchill quoted Machiavelli: "Men avenge slight injuries, but not grave ones." The Court knows that truth well; the legal foundation of the United States now rests on the assumption that the gravest crime in history cannot be avenged.

The photo on the last page shows a second stage abortion under Roe v. Wade. If the child were born alive, this Court would be guilty of murder. If the child were born

criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but ... the lawmaker has determined to make men know and obey."

O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 41 (1963).

Even if the Supreme Court held a gun to the head of a lower judge, and threatened death unless he obeyed <u>Roe</u> v. <u>Wade</u>, it would not be a defense to murder, for "he ought rather to die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent." 4 Bl. Com. 30.

The law makes a mortal distinction between killing and not killing: (1) any judge who stopped the Roe v. Wade killings, and made a mistake of law, could only be overruled on appeal; (2) but any judge who allows the killings to continue and makes a mistake of law, can be convicted of murder, and be sentenced to death. The law of capital murder is a hard school, where lessons are taught only one time, and mistakes of law are not forgiven.

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Truth has worked in this Court; judges cannot stop it. Due process has compelled this Court to admit that the unalienable guarantee of life to "any person" does include the unborn.

## CONCLUSION

Merely overruling Roe v. Wade will simply continue its crimes, perhaps on a less extensive scale. The Court misguided this nation and the entire world.

Now the Court must promulgate the truth, that the universal and unalienable guarantee of life to "any person," made in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, do include the unborn, and States have a duty to protect unborn life.

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